Work on the impact of U.S. monetary policy on emerging financial markets mostly focuses on official federal funds rate announcements; empirical evidence using data on informal communication channels, such as speeches, is scant. Employing a unique data set covering formal and informal communication channels in a GARCH model framework, we provide comprehensive evidence on the effects of U.S. monetary policy on 17 emerging equity market returns over the period 1998-2009. We find, first, that both monetary policy actions and communications have a significant impact on market returns. Second, target rate change surprises are an important driver of emerging market returns. However, informal communications-particularly when taking into account their higher frequency-have a larger (cumulative) influence on returns than do target rate surprises. Third, during the financial crisis, central bank communication plays an even more pronounced role. Finally, American emerging markets react more to U.S. central bank communications than do nonAmerican markets. We discuss the policy implications of the findings.
account for the effects of informal channels in their hedging and portfolio selection. If the findings indicate a significant transmission of communication of U.S. monetary policy to emerging economies via financial markets and this is not desirable, policymakers in these economies need to design effective policies to shield their markets from such influences.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a brief overview of the extant literature and how it relates to our contribution. Section 3 describes the construction of monetary policy news and presents the econometric methodology. In Section 4, we illustrate our results. Section 5 concludes with the policy implications of our findings.
Related Literature and Our Contribution
A growing literature investigates the effects of U.S. news-particularly U.S. monetary policy actions-on emerging markets. Hausman and Wongswan (2006) document the impact of U.S. monetary policy announcement surprises on financial markets in 49 countries. Global equity indexes respond chiefly to the target surprise; exchange rates and long-term interest rates respond mainly to the path surprise (a revision to the path of future monetary policy); and short-term interest rates respond to both surprises. Equity indexes and interest rates in countries with a less flexible exchange rate regime respond more to U.S. monetary policy surprises. In addition, the percentage of each country's equity market capitalization owned by U.S. investors and the share of each country's trade that is with the United States are also important factors in explaining the variation. Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2009) analyze 50 equity markets worldwide and show that returns fall on average around 2.7% in response to a 100 basis point tightening of U.S. monetary policy. A stronger effect of the policy is found for countries that have open and relatively more liquid financial markets. They also find that the degree of global real and financial integration, not a country's bilateral integration with the United States, is a key determinant of the policy transmission process. Wongswan (2009) documents the impact of U.S. monetary policy surprises on equity indexes in 15 developed and emerging countries. He illustrates that an unanticipated 25 basis point cut in the federal funds target rate is associated with a 0.5-2.5% increase in foreign equity indexes. The variation in response across countries is more related to the degree of financial integration these countries have with the United States, rather than with trade linkages or the degree of exchange rate flexibility. Robitaille and Roush (2006) find that an increase in U.S. interest rates due to Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) decisions results in a systematic increase in bond spreads and a decline in stock prices in Brazil. Their results suggest that financial linkages play a greater role than real economic linkages in determining the response of Brazilian asset values to U.S. news.
Several papers focus on how emerging bond markets react to U.S. target rate changes and other nonmonetary policy news. Andritzky et al. (2007) show that global bond spreads respond to rating actions and changes in U.S. interest rates rather than to domestic data and policy announcements. Examining country subsamples, they discover that U.S. news matters less to countries with more transparent policies and higher credit ratings. Arora and Cerisola (2001) show that stance and predictability of U.S. monetary policy are important for stabilizing capital flows and capital market conditions in emerging markets. Alper (2006) concludes that the unanticipated component of U.S. monetary policy is significant in explaining movements in emerging markets' sovereign bond spreads. Özatay et al. (2009) demonstrate that EMBI spreads in 18 emerging markets respond substantially to U.S. macroeconomic news and changes in the Federal Reserve's target rate. The magnitude and sign of the effect of U.S. news, however, crucially depend on the state of the U.S. economy. Uribe and Yue (2006) illustrate that in response to an increase in U.S. interest rates, emerging country spreads first fall and then display a delayed but large overshooting pattern. Miniane and Rogers (2007) find that capital controls do not effectively insulate countries from U.S. monetary policy shocks. Countries with more stringent capital controls do not experience smaller interest rate increases in response to contractionary U.S. monetary shocks than do countries without capital controls. Other factors, such as exchange rate regime or degree of dollarization, explain more of the cross-country differences. Dailami et al. (2008) discover that U.S. interest rates affect secondary market spreads differently, depending on countries' debt levels. Moderate sovereign debtors suffer little impact from an increase in U.S. interest rates, whereas countries close to insolvency face a much steeper increase in their spread. Fender et al. (2010) show that U.S. monetary policy actions and communications have at least as much of an economic influence on emerging market credit default spreads as do changes in country ratings.
Empirical evidence using data on informal communication channels in the context of emerging markets is scant. The literature (for a comprehensive survey, see Blinder et al., 2008) In this paper, we extend existing work by examining the effects of U.S. monetary policy actions and communications (post-meeting statements, monetary policy reports, testimony, and speeches) on emerging equity market returns. We employ a GARCH model with country-specific fixed effects to capture the autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity that characterizes many financial series. The GARCH approach allows estimating these series more efficiently, taking into account time-varying conditional volatility of asset prices. Our contribution to the literature lies in the use of a new data set that captures less formalized channels of U.S. monetary policy, in addition to formal channels, and an empirical investigation into their relative impact on emerging equity markets. Finally, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study on informal communication that also covers the recent financial crisis and we explicitly address the question of whether there is a different financial market reaction in "crisis times" compared to "normal times."
Our analysis focuses on emerging stock markets because they tend to be exposed to foreign news and, in particular, U.S. news for several reasons. Emerging economies rely on foreign investments to finance their catching-up process. They are also highly integrated with the U.S. economy via international trade. For example, an upswing in the U.S. economy is bound to improve the domestic economic outlook and hence increase trade flows between emerging economies and the United States. Emerging market economies are typically small and open, and tend to import inflation via exchange rate pass-through. Finally, emerging markets are characterized by the increasing global financial market integration itself. Thus, we would expect that emerging financial markets react to U.S. monetary policy news.
Data and Econometric Methodology
In our analysis, we use a new data set introduced by and described in detail in Hayo et al. (2008) In designing these news categories, we carefully read the speeches twice and then coded them independently into the appropriate dummy categories. In the case of an intercoder conflict, we read the speech yet again and adjusted our indicators accordingly. We employed extensive robustness checks to ensure that our results do not depend on the particular coding of ambiguous individual observations. We provide a few examples of speeches, along with our classification scheme, in the Appendix.
We also incorporate several variables controlling for the additional measures Potential problems associated with panel data estimation involve assuming equal coefficients across countries and a common error structure.
Descriptive statistics show that the emerging market series exhibit excess kurtosis but almost no skewness (see Table A1 in the Appendix), indicating volatility clustering (Engle, 1982) . Since preliminary OLS estimations show significant ARCH effects (F(1,50879) = 870.2**), we employ a GARCH model. We start with a general GARCH(1,1) specification (Bollerslev, 1986) as follows: is an indicator function as defined in the last line above,  t | t-1 = t(v), with  t-1 capturing all the information up to t-1, and t(v) is a t-distribution with v degrees of freedom. 5 We choose daily data instead of intra-day data for two reasons. At a conceptual level, we are interested in the question of whether there are effects of economic importance characterized by a minimum degree of persistence over time instead of just picking out short blips in the data. At a practical level, we find it impossible to time the central bank communications precisely in, say, 10-minute intervals, as is possible in the case of newswire reports. 6 We omitted six countries from the Morgan Stanley Index as they can no longer be categorized as "true" emerging markets: the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland are members of the European Union and the OECD. Büttner et al. (2009) find that European news rather than U.S. news has an impact on these markets. Korea and Turkey are members of the OECD; Taiwan is omitted due to its large market capitalization. To confirm that our selection of countries is appropriate, we calculate country-specific models and find that these countries are not affected as systematically as our selection of "emerging" markets and have different reactions to news. Colombia and Morocco are left out as data for these countries are not available for the full period 1998-2009.
The general specification (Equation (1)) is an autoregressive-distributed lag model with six lags. The vector of control variables contains past emerging market returns, S&P 1200 returns to proxy world stock market conditions, growth rates of the corresponding EMBIG regional spreads 7 to approximate an emerging market bond environment, and growth rates of the broad U.S. dollar index to control for movements in the external value of the U.S.
dollar. 8 The contemporaneous other market returns and U.S. returns are omitted to avoid simultaneity problems. Country-specific effects 9 and day of the week effects 10 are captured by dummies. Equation (1) has several special features. First, student-t distributed errors (Bollerslev, 1987) are assumed; these provide a better approximation to residuals that are not normally distributed. Second, the variance enters the mean equation (Engle et al., 1987) to test whether volatility as a measure of risk is priced in the markets. Asymmetric effects of shocks (Engle and Ng, 1993) , defined as the last period's forecast errors, are included in the model if   is significantly different from zero. In addition, asymmetry thresholds (Glosten et al., 1993) are captured when   is not equal to zero.
Target rate changes (split into expected hikes, expected cuts, surprise hikes, and surprise cuts), 11 Federal Reserve communications, and the additional measures taken during the financial crisis are included on the day the news actually reaches the respective market, which means we need to account for time-zone differences, as, e.g., a noon speech in the United States is heard in the Philippines after that country's stock exchange has closed. The timing issue is illustrated in Figure 1 . According to this stylized schedule, the variables enter the equation on the day the news actually hits the respective market. To disentangle the influence of Fed actions and communications during the financial crisis from the ones during "normal times," we create additional interaction variables for the former during the financial crisis.
12 7 An augmented Dickey-Fuller (1979) test shows that all regional EMBIG series are non-stationary in log levels but stationary in growth rates. The general GARCH(1,1) model consists of 157 variables and seven GARCH terms.
Starting from this comprehensive model, we exclude all the insignificant variables in a general-to-specific testing-down approach (see Hendry, 2000) . The final model contains 47 variables and seven GARCH terms (restriction test: Chi 2 (110) = 125.4) and removes the volatility clustering in the residuals. The estimates show that we can rule out an integrated GARCH process (Nelson, 1990; Chi 2 (1) = 28.3**).
Impact on Emerging Equity Market Returns
In this section, we describe the impact of U.S. central bank communication and target rate changes on emerging equity market returns. Table 1 shows that student-t errors with 3.1 degrees of freedom provide a better approximation to the residuals than a normal distribution. We find that last period's negative forecast errors have a larger impact on current volatility of the emerging equity markets than do positive errors, implying that unspecified negative news has more influence on volatility than does positive news. Furthermore, the conditional variance has a significantly negative impact on the mean equation. This suggests that investors move out of emerging stock markets during times of higher conditional volatility, as the required risk premium is not priced in emerging market returns. The performances of the Indian, Pakistani, Russian, and South African stock markets are better than average. Statistical testing shows (Chi 2 (2) = 0.909) that the first three of these markets can be combined into one dummy variable to enhance estimation efficiency. Day of the week effects are found for both regions; however they are stronger in the countries from the American region than in the non-American countries.
14 Weak market efficiency is violated as the first, second, and fifth lag can be used to predict today's outcome. 15 Emerging equity markets are affected by global stock market conditions via lagged S&P 1200 returns. An ascending EMBIG spread (i.e., the spread between emerging market bonds and a U.S. benchmark bond) increases stock market returns, which implies that investors move their capital into emerging equity markets in times of higher bond returns. Finally, an appreciation of the broad U.S. dollar index leads investors to move out of non-American emerging equity markets.
16
Turning to monetary policy variables (bottom half of Table 1 ), we first describe the impact on emerging equity markets over the whole sample (the "Overall" columns). Target rate changes matter for both regions only in the case of a surprise cut: a 25 bps surprise cut increases American (non-American) market returns by 76 (40) bps. 17 American markets are influenced by a greater variety of central bank communication and the reaction is also numerically larger. Statements referring to a negative economic outlook lower returns in 14 A "Wednesday effect" is found only for the American countries and the "Friday effect" is statistically larger in American than in non-American countries (Chi 2 (1) = 8.9**). The "Thursday effect" is statistically equal in both regions (Chi 2 (1) = 1.8). 15 For both regions markets, the sum of lagged returns is statistically insignificant (Chi 2 (1) = 1.1 for American countries; Chi 2 (1) = 2.3 for non-American countries). 16 In the case of changes in global equity conditions, non-American markets are more affected than American markets (test of significant differences between coefficients: Chi 2 (1) = 97.3**). The impact of the bond market environment is statistically equal across both regions (Chi 2 (1) = 0.056). Within American countries, the influence of equity and bond conditions is statistically equal (Chi 2 (1) = 3.8). In contrast, within non-American countries, the S&P 1200 is more important than the EMBIG spread (Chi 2 (1) = 15.6**) and the broad U.S. FX index (Chi 
The additional measures implemented by the Fed during the financial crisis affect
American countries more than non-American countries. The discount rate cut on August 7, 18 Chi 2 (1) = 4.4*. 19 The sum of both coefficients is statistically equal to zero (Chi 2 (1) = 0.502). 20 Chi 2 (1) = 13.6**. 21 There is no significant difference between testimony and speeches in either case (Chi 2 (1) = 1.8; Chi
2
(1) = 1.7).
2007 raises returns in the former countries by 347 bps. Measures to mitigate problems in the asset-backed security market lead to higher returns in both regions (44 bps in American countries, 63 bps in non-American countries). 22 Finally, coordinated actions by the Fed and federal government exert an influence similar to that of an unexpected target rate cut. Agents appear to believe that the coordinated effort is a signal that the situation is even worse than expected, causing returns to fall by 194 bps.
Next, we consider the economic impact of central bank communication in comparison with actual target rate changes by taking into account that the former occurs much more often than the latter. 
Note: The variables are multiplied by their respective frequency per country to show their cumulative impact. Table 2 shows the cumulative effects of communication events in our sample period, differentiated across markets and concentrating on the significant coefficients from Table 1 . A relatively small number of interest rate cuts generate noteworthy effects on returns. In the American (non-American) countries, target rate cut surprises cause equity returns to rise by 11.8 (6.3) percentage points (pp) over the whole sample. However, the aggregated cumulative effects of informal communication are substantially larger than the impact of actual interest rate changes. This indicates that the coefficients estimated for single informal communication 22 The influence is statistically equal across both regions (Chi 2 (1) = 0.401).
events may disguise their actual importance for financial market movements. In particular, speeches conveying a bright economic outlook cause the largest cumulative reaction of all variables. American market returns are raised by 20.9 pp-an impact nearly twice as large as that caused by target rate cut surprises. Furthermore, Table 2 confirms that over the full sample, American markets are more affected than non-American markets: U.S.
communication causes an absolute adjustment of American markets by 41.2 pp, whereas the impact on non-American markets is 2 pp.
The influence of U.S. monetary policy action and communication during the financial crisis is noteworthy. Target rate cuts move American countries an additional 26.4 pp during that period-even after correcting for the offsetting effects of target rate cut surprises.
Statements and additional measures by the Fed are the most important categories for
American markets, confirming the impression from Table 1 . For instance, the cumulative impact of post-meeting statements conveying a negative economic outlook is -36.7 pp and joint actions of the Fed and federal government move markets by a total of -11.7 pp. For nonAmerican markets, the cumulative absolute impact of testimony and speeches is "only" about 15 pp. Thus, as is the case in "normal" times, during the financial crisis, American countries are relatively more influenced by U.S. monetary policy actions and communications than are non-American countries.
For both the full sample period and during the financial crisis, American markets react more to U.S. monetary policy actions and communications than do non-American countries.
In explaining regional differences in a related context, Fratzscher (2009) and Wongswan (2009) emphasize the importance of global integration and financial integration with the United States, respectively. Our work lends support to these explanations, as the trade share of American countries with the United States is between 37-57% (see Table A2 in the Appendix), whereas non-American countries have trade shares of only between 11-17%.
Moreover, the financial integration of American countries, measured by the share of portfolio investment from the United States, is between 47-54% (see Table A3 in the Appendix); the share of portfolio investment in non-American countries ranges from 33 to 45%.
In our view, the differences between American and non-American markets may have yet another cause. In a different context, Boubaker and Sebai (2009) find stronger intracontinent causalities in stock markets than between stock markets in different continents.
They explain this finding by the fact that in the former case, any significant correlation is realized on the same calendar day, while there is a time lag between continents. Cai et al. (2008) study informational linkages in the euro-dollar and dollar-yen exchange rates across five trading regions. They find that informational linkages within regions are more important than those across regions. Figure 1 shows that news hits the American markets (mostly) nearly simultaneously with its occurrence, whereas there is a time lag (mostly overnight) before the non-American markets receive the same news. Our results suggest that the impact of news dissipates overnight as non-American markets do not react to the same extent as
American markets. Thus, we argue that the larger reaction of American markets can be explained by overlapping trading hours between them and the United States, resulting in U.S.
news arriving in these markets while they are still open, in addition to their greater degree of economic and financial integration with the United States.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
In this paper, we study the effects of U. 
Examples of Speeches and Their Coding
Remarks by Chairman Alan Greenspan before the Economic Club of New York (May 24,
2001)
Moreover, with inflation low and likely to be contained, the main threat to satisfactory economic performance appeared to come from excessive weakness in activity. So we took out the restraint inherent in our previous policy stance and have moved policy to a more accommodative posture to counter the effects of the downshift in demand. … The period of sub-par economic growth is not yet over, and we are not free of the risk that economic weakness will be greater than currently anticipated, requiring further policy response. 
